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1 Introduction
The study of the coordination of actions and the allocation of profits in distribution chains are
becoming popular topics nowadays. In the literature on distribution channel coordination both
cooperative and noncooperative game theory are used quite often to investigate these topics.
There are some differences between the use of noncooperative and cooperative game theory.
When applying noncooperative game theory it is assumed that each company in the supply
chain is an independent decision-maker that acts in accordance with its objective. One of the
main points of concern is whether some proposed coordination mechanism coordinates the supply
chain, that is maximizes the total profit of the supply chain, under a competitive framework.
In contrast, cooperative game theory assumes that companies can make binding agreements.
One of the main questions here is whether the cooperation is stable, that is, whether there are
allocations of the total profit among the companies such that no group of companies would like
to cooperate on its own.
Channel coordination is an issue that has been investigated under several perspectives. Its
main goal is to improve total profits and welfare. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of supply
chains by means of cooperative games. In particular, we consider single period distribution chains
with a single product. In such a supply chain, retailers place one-time orders for the product at
the supplier. After production, the supplier delivers the goods to the retailers via a warehouse.
This warehouse acts as an intermediary without costs or revenues. When the goods arrive, the
noncompeting retailers sell these on their own separate markets. The larger the quantity that
is put on the market, the lower the expected revenue per unit for the retailer. Each retailer
chooses its order quantity such that its profit is maximized.
The retailer pays the supplier a wholesale price per unit product ordered and delivered.
This price is a decreasing function of the quantity ordered. Hence, incentives for cooperation
among retailers exist. If the retailers combine their orders into one large order then they enjoy a
lower wholesale price per unit. They can do so because the warehouse only informs the supplier
about the quantities ordered and not about which retailer orders how much. Besides, retailers
may want to cooperate with the supplier which implies a further reduction in cost inefficiency
due to the absence of the intermediate wholesale prices. Obviously, the total profit under full
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cooperation is larger than the sum of the individual profits.
Because of the incentives for cooperation, we use cooperative game theory to study these
distribution chains. For each chain we define a corresponding cooperative game in which the
supplier and the retailers are the players. The value of a coalition of players equals the optimal
joint profit they can achieve. We show that the core of such a game is never empty, that is,
all companies in the chain are willing to cooperate because there exist stable distributions of
the total profit among the companies upon which no coalition can improve. Any distribution of
profits that belongs to the core has a nice interpretation in terms of the underlying distribution
chain. Further, we introduce a specific allocation of the total profit for distribution chains, the
so-called minimal-gain-per-capita (mgpc) solution. This solution is a stable distribution of the
profits, that is, it always belongs to the core of the game, and it possess several nice properties.
In particular, it takes into account the importance of the supplier to achieve full cooperation.
Finally, a characterization of the mgpc-solution is provided.
Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the analysis of problems in Operations
Research by means of cooperative game theory. Some recent papers in this area are [8], [12], [9],
[7] and [23], and for a survey we refer to [4]. Closely related to our work are papers that focus on
cooperation in supply chains by means of cooperative games. Perhaps one of the first to do so
is [15], who uses cooperative game theory to study the allocation of joint inventory control costs
among multiple retailers. The author shows that the Shapley value [16] of the corresponding
cooperative game belongs to the core, and as such is a fair and suitable allocation for sharing
the costs. In [25] a three-player newsvendor game is analyzed by means of both noncooperative
and cooperative game theory. Among others, conditions are given such that the core of related
cooperative games is nonempty and the authors conclude that full cooperation cannot always
be obtained. [19] studies joint ordering by multiple retailers. The authors study a related
cooperative game in which the retailers are the players. Their main result is that this game
has a nonempty core. This result is extended in subsequent studies [14, 20]. Noncooperative
game theory is also used to study problems in supply chains namely, among others, to study
coordination mechanisms, like contracts, under horizontal and vertical competition. We refer to
[1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 21, 22, 24] for reviews on analyses of contracts. Finally, [13] analyses collaboration
for the economic order quantity model by using bargaining concepts from non-cooperative and
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cooperative game theory.
The contribution of our paper to the literature is twofold. First, we include the supplier in
our analysis and study cooperation among retailers and the supplier. Second, we introduce a
tailor-made allocation of the joint profit that always belongs to the core of the game. The above-
mentioned literature only considers cooperation among retailers and hardly pays attention to
suitable allocations of the joint benefits.
The contents of this paper are as follows. In the next section we introduce the necessary con-
cepts of cooperative game theory. Our model of a single period distribution chain is introduced
and studied in section 3. A related cooperative game, the RS-game, is studied in section 4.
Thereafter, in section 5, we show that RS-games always have a nonempty core. Any allocation
in the core is shown to have a nice interpretation in terms of its underlying distribution chain.
In section 6 we introduce and study the mgpc-solution for RS-games. We show that it belongs
to the core and characterize it. Section 7 concludes.
2 Preliminaries cooperative game theory
A cooperative (benefit) game with transferable utility (TU game) is a pair (N, v) where N =
{1, 2, ..., n} is the finite player set. Let P (N) be the set containing all subsets of N then
v : P (N) → R is the characteristic function of the game satisfying v(∅) = 0. A coalition is a
nonempty subset of N . The subgame vS related to coalition S is the restriction of the mapping
v to the subcoalitions of S. We denote by s the cardinality of the set S ⊆ N , i.e. card(S) = s. A
benefit vector, or allocation, is denoted by x ∈ Rn. The core of the game (N, v) consists of those
allocations of v(N) in which each coalition receives at least its benefit as prescribed by the charac-
teristic function: Core(N, v) =
{
x ∈ Rn /∑i∈N xi = v(N) and ∑i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N } .
A core-allocation x ∈ Core(N, v) is both efficient, that is ∑i∈N xi = v(N), and it satisfies the
coalitional stability property, that is
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N . A game (N, v) is balanced
if and only if it has a nonempty core [3, 17]. It is a totally balanced game if all its subgames are
balanced.
A game (N, v) is strict monotone increasing if v(S) < v(T ) for all S ⊂ T. It is superadditive
if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) holds for all disjoint coalitions S and T . In a superadditive game,
it is always beneficial for two disjoint coalitions to cooperate and form a larger coalition. A
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well-known class of balanced and superadditive games is the class of convex games [18]. A game
(N, v) is convex if v(S∪{i})−v(S) ≤ v(T ∪{i})−v(T ) for all i ∈ N and for all S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{i}.
A single-valued solution ϕ for TU games (N, v) is a map ϕ : ΓN → RN where ΓN is the class
of TU-games with player set N . The payoff to player i ∈ N in game v ∈ ΓN according to this
solution is denoted by ϕi(v) and ϕ(v) = (ϕi(v))i∈N .
We denote by Rn+ the set of n-dimensional real vectors whose components are nonnegative.
For a, b ∈ R, a < b, [a, b] is a closed interval and (a, b) an open interval in R.
3 Retailer-Supplier problems
In this paper we study single period models of distribution chains involving a single product.
In these chains, a supplier replenishes his goods to several retailers via a warehouse. One can
think, for example, of a car manufacturer (supplier) who is about to produce a car with special
features that will only be temporarily available. This is a single period model in which the
local car dealers (retailers) have one opportunity to place their orders for this special car at the
national importer (warehouse), who passes the national orders to the car manufacturer. In this
section we first concentrate on a chain with a single retailer. Chains with multiple retailers are
considered in the next section.
The retailer places a one-time order, say of size q units, for the good at the warehouse, who
passes this information to the supplier. The costs of this order are w(q) per unit for the retailer,
where the wholesale price function w : R+ → (c,+∞) (i.e. w(q) > c for all q ≥ 0) is a decreasing
and continuous function. It’s decreasing nature represents quantity discounts provided by the
supplier: the more the retailer orders, the lower the price per unit he has to pay. The ordered
goods are produced by the supplier at a cost of c per unit. After production the goods are
shipped to the warehouse, who acts as an intermediate party with no costs or benefits. The
warehouse sends the goods to the retailer, who in turn sells the goods on the market. The
expected revenue of the retailer is p(q) per unit of the good, given the supply of q units on the
consumer market. The expected price function p : R+ → R is decreasing and continuous in q,
satisfies p(0) > w(0) and there exists a quantity q > 0 such that p(q) = c. Notice that the latter
condition makes sense from an economic point of view since if p(q) > c for all q then the parties
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in the chain can obtain arbitrary large profits.
A retailer-supplier problem (henceforth: RS-problem) is denoted by the tuple (c, w, p). Given
such a problem let Q = {q ∈ R+ | p(q) ≥ w(q)} be the set of feasible order sizes, that is, those
order sizes that result in a nonnegative profit margin for the retailer. Notice that Q 6= ∅ because
p(0) > w(0).
The retailer determines his order quantity q such that his (expected) profit is maximized:
max Πret (q;w (q)) = (p(q)− w(q)) q
s.t. q ∈ Q.
This optimization problem always has an optimal solution/order size q since Q is a compact
set and Πret (q;w (q)) is continuous on Q. Given the retailer’s order size q, the supplier’s profit
equals
Πsup (q;w (q)) = (w(q)− c) q.
The two examples1 below show that the retailer may have one or more optimal order sizes.
Example 3.1 Let (c, w, p) be an RS-problem with c = 2, p(q) = 7− q and
w(q) =
 5, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,2 + 3/q, q > 1.
The retailer solves
max Πret (q;w (q))
s.t. q ∈ Q =
[
0,
5 +
√
13
2
]
where
Πret (q;w (q)) =
 2q − q2, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1−q2 + 5q − 3, q > 1.
The unique optimal order size is q∗ = 212 , leading to a profit of Π
ret (q∗;w (q∗)) = 314 for the
retailer and Πsup (q∗;w (q∗)) = 3 for the supplier.
1The reader should notice that some calculations may be needed to check the examples.
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Example 3.2 Let (c, w, p) be an RS-problem with c = 1,
p(q) =

5, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
6− q, 1 < q ≤ 2,
5− q2 , q > 2,
and
w(q) =

4, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
3 + 1q , 1 < q ≤ 2,
214 +
5
2q , 2 < q ≤ 212 ,
314 , q > 2
1
2 .
Now the retailer solves
max Πret (q;w (q))
s.t. q ∈ Q =
[
0, 3
1
2
]
where
Πret (q;w (q)) =

q, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
−q2 + 3q − 1, 1 < q ≤ 2,
−12q2 + 234q − 212 , 2 < q ≤ 212 ,
−12q2 + 134q, q > 212 .
This leads to two optimal order sizes, namely q∗a = 1
1
2 and q
∗
b = 2
1
2 . In either case the opti-
mal benefit for the retailer is 114 . The profit for the supplier is either Π
sup (q∗a;w (q∗a)) = 4 or
Πsup (q∗b ;w (q
∗
b )) = 5
5
8 . The reader may notice that the supplier prefers q
∗
b over q
∗
a because it
results in larger profits. However, he has no means to induce it. The only way the supplier
would be able to influence the retailer’s decision is by changing the wholesale price w(q), but that
is outside the scope of this paper.
4 Retailers-Supplier games
In this section we address a natural extension of the RS-problem, namely, we consider single
period models of distribution chains with a supplier, a warehouse and multiple retailers. Each
of the retailers places its order at the warehouse, who passes the order sizes to the supplier.
The retailers have the possibility to cooperate among each other and place a joint order, which
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results in a lower wholesale price per unit. The supplier will not know about the cooperation
since he only receives the order sizes and does not know which order size belongs to which re-
tailer(s). Hence the presence of the warehouse allows the retailers to save money by cooperation.
Furthermore, a group of retailers may cooperate with the supplier via the warehouse. In this
case, the warehouse provides all parties with the necessary information to achieve cooperation.
After delivery of the goods from the supplier via the warehouse to the retailers, each retailer
sells its goods on its local consumer market. These markets are independent from one another,
implying that the retailers do not compete for customers.
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of retailers and denote the supplier by 0. Then N0 = N ∪ {0}
is the set of all companies in the chain. Similarly, we define S0 = S ∪ {0} for all S ⊆ N . A
retailers-supplier situation (RS-situation) is a tuple (N0, c, w, P ) with P = (p1, ..., pn), pi is the
expected price function of retailer i, and the tuple (c, w, pi) is an RS-problem for any retailer i.
In such an RS-situation two types of cooperation among the companies may occur, namely
cooperation excluding or including the supplier. First, cooperation among retailers is profitable
since the firms may place one large joint order for the good and thus enjoy a quantity discount
provided by the supplier. If qS =
∑
i∈S qi denotes the total order size by a coalition S ⊆ N of
retailers then the joint benefit of this coalition equals
max
∑
i∈S
(pi(qi)− w (qS)) qi
s.t. q ∈ QS := {q ∈ Rs+ | pi(qi) ≥ w(qS) for all i ∈ S} .
The reader may notice that QS is a nonempty set since (q{i}i )i∈S ∈ QS , where q{i}i is an optimal
solution for retailer i’s RS-problem (c, w, pi). Besides, QS ⊂
∏
i∈S [0, q
∗
i ], where the order size q
∗
i
satisfies pi(q∗i ) = c, andQS is closed. Hence, there exists an optimal solution for this optimization
problem. Let qSi denote the optimal order size for retailer i when cooperating in coalition S.
A second type of cooperation is cooperation among a group of retailers S and the supplier.
The joint benefit of this coalition S0 is
∑
i∈S
Πreti (qi;w(qS)) +
∑
i∈S
Πsupi (qi;w(qS)) =
∑
i∈S
(pi(qi)− c) qi,
which shows a reduction in cost inefficiency for the companies due to the absence of the inter-
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mediate wholesale prices. Under cooperation this coalition optimizes
max
∑
i∈S
(pi(qi)− c) qi
s.t. q ∈ QSc :=
{
q ∈ Rs+ | pi(qi) ≥ c for all i ∈ S
}
,
which is equivalent to
for all i ∈ S : max (pi(qi)− c) qi (1)
s.t. pi(qi) ≥ c
Similar arguments as above assure the existence of optimal solutions for these optimization
problems. Let qci denote the optimal order size for retailer i in this situation. Notice that this
quantity does not depend on S or S0, since the optimization problem (1) for i only depends on
individual parameters. Also, in general qci 6= qSi for all coalitions S with i ∈ S.
The profit functions arising from cooperation have nice properties, as stated in the lemma
below.
Lemma 4.1 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation, and i ∈ S ⊆ N Then
(P1) Πreti (q
S
i ; c) = Π
ret
i
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
+Πsupi (q
S
i ;w(q
S
S ));
(P2) Πreti (q
c
i ; c) ≥ Πreti
(
qSi ; c
)
;
(P3) Πreti (q
c
i ; c) > Π
ret
i
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
and Πreti (q
c
i ; c) > Π
sup
i
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
.
Proof. (P1) follows immediately from the definitions of Πreti and Π
sup
i . (P2) follows from
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) = maxqi (pi(qi)− c) qi ≥
(
pi(qSi )− c
)
qSi . Finally, (P3) follows from (P1), (P2),
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
> 0 and Πsupi
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
> 0.
Next we define the cooperative game corresponding to an RS-situation. Its characteristic
function is based on the maximum profit that each coalition can reach.
Definition 4.2 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation. The corresponding RS-game (N0, v) is
defined by
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
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and
v(S0) =
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c)
for all coalitions S ⊆ N , and v(∅) = 0.
The definition of RS-situations and their corresponding games focuses on retailer revenues
arising from selling goods to consumers. As a consequence one may interpret the game value
v(T ) of a coalition T as being ‘zero-normalised’ with respect to the supplier. This explains why
v({0}) = 0.
The definition above shows that a coalition of retailers benefits from a lower wholesale price
per unit while a coalition including the supplier increases its profit due to the absence of the
intermediate wholesale prices. This provides the companies in the chain with sufficient incentives
for cooperation. Also, cooperation with the supplier is attractive for retailers since v(S0) > v(S)
by property (P3). The reader may notice that the supplier does not contribute with a fixed
quantity of gain but rather he reduces the cost inefficiency by suppressing the intermediate
wholesale prices. To be more precise, if the supplier joins a coalition S of retailers then this
leads to an increase of
v(S0)− v(S) =
∑
i∈S
(pi(qci )− c) qci −
∑
i∈S
(
pi(qSi )− w(qSS )
)
qSi .
Besides the optimal quantity for each retailer does depend upon the presence of the supplier in
the coalition. Namely, if the supplier is present then the optimal quantity for referee i is qci and
if the supplier is not present then it is qSi . See for instance example 5.7 in which q
S
i = 49 (the
supplier is not present) and qci = 48
1
5 (the supplier is present) for i = 1, 2 and S ⊆ N. Hence,
the difference among v(S0) and v(S) does not just depend upon the gain of the supplier. The
increase is also due to the retailers: cooperation increases the gain of the retailers since for all
i ∈ S
(pi(qci )− c) qci >
(
pi(qSi )− w(qSS )
)
qSi .
Therefore, the supplier has reasons to share the gain from cooperation with the retailers.
The example below shows an RS-situation and its corresponding RS-game.
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Example 4.3 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation with N0 = {0, 1, 2}, c = 2, p1(q) = 7 − q,
p2(q) = 8− q and
w(q) =
 5,
1
4 ≤ q ≤ 1,
2 + 3/q, q > 1.
The optimal order sizes are qS1 = q
c
1 = 2
1
2 and q
S
2 = q
c
2 = 3 for all S ⊆ N . This implies the
RS-game as given in the table below.
T {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(T ) 0 314 6 6
1
4 9 12
1
4 15
1
4
This game has positive values for coalitions T 6= {0}, is superadditive and monotone increasing.
In addition, v(N0) = v({0, 1}) + v({0, 2}).
The properties that are observed in this example hold in general, as the next lemma shows.
Lemma 4.4 Let (N0, v) be an RS-game. Then
(i) v(T ) > 0 for all coalitions T 6= {0};
(ii) v is superadditive;
(iii) v is strict monotone increasing;
(iv) v(S0) =
∑
i∈S v({0, i}) and v(S0)− v(S0\{i}) = v({0, i}) for all S ⊆ N and i ∈ S.
Proof. (i) The definition of the game (N0, v) and the positive profit margins for the retailers
(pi(q) > w(q)) imply that v(T ) > 0 for any coalition T 6= {0}.
(ii) Let S, T ⊆ N be two disjoint coalitions of retailers. By definition of the RS-game
v(S) + v(T ) =
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
+
∑
i∈T
Πreti (q
T
i ;w
(
qTT
)
).
Define the specific order quantity qˆi for retailer i in coalition S ∪ T by qˆi = qSi if i ∈ S and
qˆi = qTi if i ∈ T . Now∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
+
∑
i∈T
Πreti (q
T
i ;w
(
qTT
)
)
≤
∑
i∈S
Πreti (qˆi;w (qˆS∪T )) +
∑
i∈T
Πreti (qˆi;w (qˆS∪T ))
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because this larger coalition enjoys a lower wholesale price than before: w(qˆS∪T ) = w(qSS+q
T
T ) ≤
min{w (qSS) , w (qTT )}. Finally,∑
i∈S
Πreti (qˆi;w (qˆS∪T )) +
∑
i∈T
Πreti (qˆi;w (qˆS∪T ))
=
∑
i∈S∪T
Πreti (qˆi;w (qˆS∪T ))
≤
∑
i∈S∪T
Πreti
(
qS∪Ti ;w
(
qS∪TS∪T
))
= v(S ∪ T ),
since the quantities qˆi need not be optimal for coalition S ∪ T .
Furthermore,
v(S0) + v(T ) =
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) +
∑
i∈T
Πreti (q
T
i ;w
(
qTT
)
)
<
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) +
∑
i∈T
Πreti (q
c
i ; c)
=
∑
i∈S∪T
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) = v(S0 ∪ T ),
where the second inequality is due to property (P3).
(iii) This follows immediately from (i), (ii) and (P3).
(iv) These results follow directly from the definition of the game.
The fourth property in this lemma shows that each optimal profit of a large coalition including
the supplier is composed of optimal profits for pairs of the supplier and a retailer. This is due
to the fact that the retailers do not compete for customers but rather serve their own market.
5 The core of RS-games
The core is an important set-solution for cooperative games. In this section we show that every
RS-game is balanced, that is, its core is nonempty. But first we present the core structure for
RS-games.
Theorem 5.1 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation and (N0, v) the corresponding RS-game. The
core of this game equals
Core(N0, v) =
x ∈ Rn0
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈N0 xi = v(N0); xi ≤ v({0, i}), i ∈ N ;∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S), S ⊆ N
 .
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Proof. Let i ∈ N and x ∈ Core(N0, v). The core conditions
∑
i∈N0 xi = v(N0) and
∑
j∈N0\{i} xj ≥
v(N0 \ {i}) imply xi ≤ v(N0)− v(N0 \ {i}), which leads to
xi ≤ v(N0)− v(N0 \ {i}) = v(N0)− (v(N0)− v({0, i})) = v({0, i}),
in which the first equality follows from property (iv) in lemma 4.4.
We proceed by showing that the core conditions x0+
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S0), S ⊆ N , are superflu-
ous. We obtain subsequently
x0 +
∑
i∈S
xi =
∑
i∈N0
xi −
∑
j∈N\S
xj
≥ v(N0)−
∑
j∈N\S
v({0, j})
=
∑
j∈S
v({0, j}) = v(S0),
by using respectively
∑
i∈N0 xi = v(N0), xj ≤ v({0, j}) and property (iv) in lemma 4.4.
This theorem says that the stability conditions for coalitions including the supplier (i.e.∑
i∈S0 xi ≥ v(S0)) can be replaced by the conditions xi ≤ v({0, i}) for all retailers i. This allows
for an easier expression of the core of RS-games.
Using the above theorem, the core of example 4.3 can be expressed as
Core(N0, v) =
(x0, x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 3
1
4 ≤ x1 ≤ 614 , 6 ≤ x2 ≤ 9,
x1 + x2 ≥ 1214 , x0 + x1 + x2 = 1514
 .
One immediately sees that this core is nonempty since (0, 614 , 9) ∈ Core(N0, v). Nonemptiness
of the core of RS-games in general is shown in the theorem below.
Theorem 5.2 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation and (N0, v) the corresponding RS-game.
Then (N0, v) is balanced.
Proof. Define the allocation xa(v) by xa0(v) = 0 and x
a
i (v) = Π
ret
i (q
c
i ; c) = v({0, i}), i ∈ N . In
this allocation the retailer receives all the benefit from cooperation with the supplier, while the
supplier receives nothing. First notice that
∑
i∈N0
xai (v) =
∑
i∈N
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) = v(N0).
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Hence, xa(v) is an efficient allocation. Next, consider a coalition S ⊆ N . Then
∑
i∈S
xai (v) =
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) >
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
= v(S),
where the inequality follows from property (P3). Finally, by definition xai (v) ≤ v({0, i}). We
conclude that xa(v) ∈ Core(N0, v), thus, the game is balanced.
The proof of this theorem shows that the allocation xa(v) =
(
0, (v({0, i})i∈N
)
always belongs
to the core of an RS-game. This allocation will be called the altruistic allocation since it is the
worst possible core-allocation for the supplier, namely the only one in which he receives nothing.
As a corollary of this theorem we obtain balancedness of subgames including the supplier in
the player set.
Corollary 5.3 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation and S a coalition of retailers. Let PS denote
the restriction of the vector of consumer price functions P to coalition S. Then the game (S0, vS0)
corresponding to the RS-situation (S0, c, w, PS) is balanced.
This corollary and its preceding theorem show that cooperation is profitable for all companies
in the distribution chain because (a) it results in higher profits, and (b) there exists a core-
allocation of the joint optimal profit, that is, an allocation upon which no coalition can improve.
The core of RS-games has a nice alternative interpretation in terms of the underlying distri-
bution chain, as we will see shortly. For this, we need the following lemma and its corollary.
Lemma 5.4 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation. Then there exist prices w∗i ∈ [c, pi(qci )], i ∈ N ,
such that
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) ≥ max
S⊆N :i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
.
Proof. Consider a coalition S of retailers and let i ∈ S be one of them. Then by property (P3)
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) > Π
ret
i
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
> 0.
This implies that there exists a number βS , 0 < βS < Πreti (q
c
i ; c), such that Π
ret
i
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
=
Πreti (q
c
i ; c)−βS . Furthermore, there is a wholesale price wSi ∈ [c, pi(qci )] such that Πsupi (qci ;wSi ) =
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(wSi − c)qci ≤ βS . Thus
Πreti
(
qSi ;w
(
qSS
))
= Πreti (q
c
i ; c)− βS
≤ Πreti (qci ; c)−Πsupi (qci ;wSi )
= Πreti
(
qci ;w
S
i
)
,
where property (P1) is used in the last equality. Let w∗i = minS3iw
S
i be the lowest wholesale
price for retailer i. Then
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) ≥ Πreti
(
qci ;w
S
i
) ≥ Πreti (qSi ;w(qSS ))
for all S ⊆ N with i ∈ S, which concludes the proof.
Notice that this lemma generates upper bounds lower than pi(qci ) for the values w
∗
i . Lower
bounds for w∗i are given by c. As a corollary we obtain the following weaker result.
Corollary 5.5 Let (N0, c, , w, P ) be an RS-situation. Then there exist prices w∗i ≥ c, i ∈ N ,
such that ∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) ≥
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
= v(S),
or equivalently, ∑
i∈S
qciw
∗
i ≤
∑
i∈S
pi(qci )q
c
i − v(S),
for all coalitions S of retailers.
Using this corollary we provide an alternative formulation of the core of an RS-game.
Theorem 5.6 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation and (N0, v) the corresponding RS-game.
Then x ∈ Core(N0, v) if and only if
x0 =
∑
i∈N
Πsupi (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) and xi = Π
ret
i (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) , i ∈ N,
for some w∗ ∈ Rn that satisfies corollary 5.5.
Proof. First, according to theorem 5.2 Core(N0, v) 6= ∅ All elements x ∈ Core(N0, v) satisfy
v({i}) ≤ xi ≤ v(N0)− v(N0 \ {i})
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for all i ∈ N0. Using the definition of the RS-game this condition is equivalent to
xLi = Π
ret
i
(
qii;w(q
{i}
i )
)
≤ xi ≤ Πreti (qci ; c) = xHi
for all retailers i ∈ N . Now, let x∗ = (x∗0, x∗1, ..., x∗n) ∈ Core(N0, v). Notice that Πreti (qci ; pi(qci )) =
0 and so
x∗i ∈ [x∗Li , x∗Hi ] ⊂ [Πreti (qci ; pi(qci )) ,Πreti (qci ; c)]
for all i ∈ N . Because of this, there exists w∗i ∈ [c, pi(qci )] such that x∗i = Πreti (qci ;w∗i ). The
efficiency of core-elements implies x∗0 =
∑
i∈N Π
sup
i (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ). For any coalition S ⊆ N of retailers
v(S) ≤
∑
i∈S
x∗i ⇐⇒
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
) ≤∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) .
Hence, the w∗i satisfy corollary 5.5. This concludes the first part of the proof.
Second, let w∗ ∈ Rn satisfy corollary 5.5. Define the allocation x∗ by
x∗i =

∑
j∈N Π
sup
j
(
qcj ;w
∗
j
)
, i = 0,
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) , i ∈ N.
Notice first that ∑
i∈N0
x∗i =
∑
i∈N
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) +
∑
j∈N
Πsupj
(
qcj ;w
∗
j
)
= v(N0)
where the last equality is due to property (P1). Hence, x∗ is an efficient allocation. Next,
consider a coalition S ⊆ N . Then∑
i∈S
x∗i =
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) ≥
∑
i∈S
Πreti
(
qSi ;w(q
S
S )
)
= v(S),
where the inequality follows from corollary 5.5. Further,∑
i∈S0
x∗i =
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈N
Πsupi (q
c
i ;w
∗
i )
=
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) +
∑
i∈N\S
Πsupi (q
c
i ;w
∗
i )
≥
∑
i∈S
Πreti (q
c
i ; c) = v(S0),
where the second equality is due to property (P1). We conclude that x∗ ∈ Core(N0, v).
This theorem shows that for each core-allocation x there exist fixed wholesale prices w∗
such that the retailer’s share xi corresponds to its optimal profit under cooperation with the
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supplier given the wholesale price w∗i , xi = Π
ret
i (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ), and the supplier’s share equals x0 =∑
i∈N Π
sup
i (q
c
i ;w
∗
i ). Hence, each core-allocation has a natural interpretation in terms of the
underlying distribution chain.
Further, this theorem shows that the structure of the core is determined by the values w∗i .
Corollary 5.5 generates for each coalition S of retailers an upper bound for {w∗i }i∈S , which is
related to the core-condition of this coalition. The lower bound w∗i = c corresponds to the upper
bound v({0, i}) for xi. This corresponds with the formulation of the core in theorem 5.1. The
example below illustrates these observations.
Example 5.7 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be the RS-situation with N0 = {0, 1, 2}, c = 145 , p1(q) = p2(q) =
50− q2 , and
w(q) =

11, 0 ≤ q ≤ 10,
1 + 100q , 10 < q ≤ 100,
2, q > 100.
The optimal order sizes are qSi = 49 and q
c
i = 48
1
5 for i = 1, 2 and S ⊆ N. The coalitional values
in the corresponding game are
T {0} {1} {2} {0, 1} {0, 2} {1, 2} {0, 1, 2}
v(T ) 0 110012 1100
1
2 1161
31
50 1161
31
50 2301 2323
6
25
The core of this game equals
Core(N0, v) =
(x0, x1, x2)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1100
1
2 ≤ xi ≤ 11613150 , i = 1, 2;
x1 + x2 ≥ 2301; x0 + x1 + x2 = 2323 625

=


4815 (w
∗
1 + w
∗
2)− 1731325 ,
12481950 − 4815w∗1,
12481950 − 4815w∗2

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
145 ≤ w∗i ≤ 3 821205 , i = 1, 2;
w∗1 + w∗2 ≤ 4 741205 .
 .
The correspondence between the two formulations is clear:
1
4
5
≤ w∗i ⇐⇒ xi ≤ 1248
19
50
− 481
5
· 14
5
= 1161
31
50
and
w∗i ≤ 3
82
1205
⇐⇒ xi ≥ 12481950 − 48
1
5
· 3 82
1205
= 1100
1
2
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for i = 1, 2. Also,
w∗1 + w
∗
2 ≤ 4
74
1205
⇐⇒ x1 + x2 ≥ 24961925 − 48
1
5
· 4 74
1205
= 2301.
Finally, the equality
48
1
5
(w∗1 + w
∗
2)− 173
13
25
+ 1248
19
50
− 481
5
w∗1 + 1248
19
50
− 481
5
w∗2 = 2323
6
25
implies that the allocations are efficient.
This example shows that there is a one-to-one relation between the conditions of the core
of RS-games in both the reduced formulation in theorem 5.1 and the alternative formulation in
theorem 5.6.
6 A solution for RS-games
In the previous section one single-valued solution for RS-games was already discussed briefly,
namely the altruistic allocation xa(v). This allocation always belongs to the core but it is not
fair because it assigns a zero payoff to the supplier although this company is needed to obtain
the largest total profits. Instead, a suitable solution for RS-games should assign a positive payoff
to the supplier and it should belong to the core of the game. Four desirable properties for a
single-valued solution ϕ for RS-games (N0, v) are:
(EF) Efficiency.
∑
i∈N0 ϕi(v) = v(N0).
(SR) Stability for retailers.
∑
i∈S ϕi(v) ≥ v(S) for all coalitions S ⊆ N.
(RR) Retailer reduction. ϕi(v) = v({0, i}) − v(S
i
0)−v(Si)
si
for some coalition Si ⊆ N , for all
i ∈ N.
(PD) Preservation of differences for retailers. ϕi(v)−ϕj(v) = v({0, i})−v({0, j}) for all i, j ∈ N
with i 6= j.
Efficiency implies that the total benefit is divided among the players, while stability for retailers
ensures coalitional stability for all coalitions of retailers. The retailer reduction property says
that a retailer receives an amount smaller than his joint profit with the supplier v({0, i}). The
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reduction equals the gain per capita for coalition Si from cooperation with the supplier, (v(Si0)−
v(Si))/si, for some coalition of retailers Si. Finally, the preservation of differences for retailers
property is a modification of the preservation of differences property by [10]. The (PD) property
states that the difference in payoffs for two retailers should equal the difference in their joint
profits with the supplier.
The main result in this section states that there exists a unique solution for RS-games
satisfying the properties (EF), (SR), (RR) and (PD).
Theorem 6.1 Let (N0, c, w, P ) be an RS-situation and (N0, v) the corresponding RS-game. The
unique solution ξ on the class of RS-games, RSN0, satisfying (EF), (SR), (RR) and (PD) is
ξ(v) = (ξi(v))i∈N0 defined by
ξi(v) =
 nβ, i = 0,v({0, i})− β, i ∈ N,
where β = minS⊆N,S 6=∅
{
v(S0)−v(S)
s
}
.
Proof. It is clear that ξ(v) satisfies (EF), (SR), (RR) and (PD).
To show the converse, take a solution ϕ on the class of RS-games that satisfies (EF), (SR),
(RR) and (PD). By (RR), ϕi(v) = v({0, i})−αi with αi = (v(Si0)− v(Si))/si for some coalition
Si ⊆ N , for all retailers i. By (PD), αi = αj for all i, j ∈ N with i 6= j. This implies
αi = α∗ for all i ∈ N . According to (SR)
∑
i∈S ϕi(v) = v(S0) − sα∗ ≥ v(S) or equivalently
α∗ ≤ (v(S0)− v(S))/s for all coalitions S ⊆ N . But then α∗ = minS⊆N,S 6=∅{(v(S0)− v(S))/s}.
Finally, by (EF) we conclude ϕ = ξ.
This unique solution ξ is called the minimal-gain-per-capita solution (in short: mgpc-solution)
because each retailer pays the minimal gain per capita β to the supplier. Two properties of
mgpc-solutions follow.
Lemma 6.2 For all RS-games (N0, v) the mgpc-solution is a core allocation, ξ(v) ∈ Core(N0, v),
and it assures a positive payoff to the supplier, ξ0(v) > 0.
Proof. By property (iii) in lemma 4.4 v(S0) > v(S), which implies β > 0. Hence,
ξi(v) = v({0, i})− β < v({0, i})
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for all retailers i. Together with (EF) and (SR) we conclude ξ(v) ∈ Core(N0, v). Second, the
positive value of β immediately implies ξ0(v) > 0.
This lemma shows that the mgpc-solution ξ(v) is a stable allocation since it belongs to the
core. Further, the supplier prefers this allocation to the altruistic allocation xa(v) because it
assigns a larger payoff to him.
Upon comparison of the mgpc-solution with the Shapley value Sh(v) [16], we observe the
following. In the table below the solutions are mentioned for example 4.3.
ξ(v) xa(v) Sh(v)

3
434
712


0
614
9


2
514
8

In this example the Shapley value belongs to the core since the game is convex. The supplier
prefers the mgpc-solution to the Shapley value since it results in a larger payoff 3 instead of
2. If in this example the wholesale price function w is changed to w(q) = 5 if 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and
w(q) = 9/2 + 1/(2q) if q > 1 then the solutions change as follows.
ξ(v) xa(v) Sh(v)

1038
1 116
31316


0
614
9


53148
37196
58396

Again, all three solutions belong to the core and the supplier prefers the mgpc-solution. In
example 5.7 the solutions are as follows.
ξ(v) xa(v) Sh(v)

22 625
115012
115012


0
11613150
11613150


275975
1147109150
1147109150

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Here, the Shapley value is not a core-allocation. Obviously, the supplier prefers the mgpc-
solution to the altruistic allocation. From these observations we conclude that the mgpc-solution
ξ is suitable for RS-games because (a) it recognizes the importance of the supplier in achieving
full cooperation and (b) it always belongs to the core of the RS-game, as opposed to the Shapley
value.
Finally, to conclude this section, the four examples below show that the properties (EF),
(SR), (RR) and (PD) are logically independent.
Example 6.3 Consider the solution ϕ on RSN0 defined by
ϕi(v) =
 0, i = 0,v({0, i})− β, i ∈ N.
ϕ satisfies (SR), (RR) and (PD) but not (EF).
Example 6.4 Consider ϕ on RSN0 defined by
ϕi(v) =
 nβ∗, i = 0,v({0, i})− β∗, i ∈ N,
where β∗ = maxS⊆N,S 6=∅ {(v(S0)− v(S))/s}. ϕ satisfies (EF), (RR) and (PD) but not (SR).
Example 6.5 Consider ϕ on RSN0 defined by
ϕi(v) =
 n (β − 1) , i = 0,v({0, i})− (β − 1), i ∈ N.
ϕ satisfies (EF), (SR) and (PD) but not (RR).
Example 6.6 Consider ϕ on RSN0 defined by
ϕi(v) =

∑
j∈N βj , i = 0,
v({0, i})− βi, i ∈ N,
where βi := minS⊆N,i∈S {(v(S0)− v(S))/s}, i ∈ N . ϕ satisfies (EF), (SR) and (RR) but not
(PD).
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we studied single-period distribution chains consisting of a supplier and multiple
non-competing retailers from a game-theoretic viewpoint. All companies have incentives to
cooperate since this results in reduced costs and consequently in increased profits. Therefore,
these chains are analyzed by means of their corresponding cooperative games, the RS-games.
Among others it is shown that any RS-game has a nonempty core. Further, any core-allocation
has a natural interpretation in terms of its underlying distribution chain. One such a core-
allocation is the mgpc-solution for RS-games, whose characterization is included. This solution
is fit for RS-games since it recognizes the importance of the supplier in achieving full cooperation.
These results imply that the companies in a distribution chain are willing to cooperate because
there exist stable distributions of the joint profit, namely the core-allocations. Further, the
mgpc-solution is a suitable allocation since it is designed especially for this kind of distribution
chains.
Topics for further research are: (1) examine other core-allocations like e.g. the nucleolus, and
the τ -value; (2) investigate how the results change if the wholesale price function is endogenous;
(3) analyze what happens if the unit production cost depends on the total quantity to be
produced; (4) study the new model and game that arise when considering the warehouse as a
decision-maker/player.
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